Debt Collection Letter

U.S. 9th Riggs v PROBER & RAPHAEL Opinion by Judge Callahan  we have previously held that a collection letter, called a “validation notice” or “Dunning letter,” violates § 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA “insofar as it state[s] that [the debtor’s] disputes must be made in writing.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). Unlike the validation notice at issue in Camacho, Prober’s notice did not state that Riggs must dispute her debt in writing. Riggs argues that Prober’s notice nonetheless violates § 1692g(a)(3) because it implicitly requires written disputes. Assuming without deciding that Prober’s notice can be understood implicitly to require written disputes, we hold that a validation notice violates § 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA only where it expressly requires a consumer to dispute her debt in writing. We hold that Prober’s notice does not violate § 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA by impermissibly requiring Riggs to dispute her debt in writing. The notice does not expressly state such a requirement. Assuming without deciding that the notice could be understood to imply a writing requirement, that implication is part of the statute itself. Such an implicit requirement does not violate § 1692g(a)(3). Because Riggs’s alleged § 1692g(a)(3) violation served as the only basis for her alleged violations of §§ 1692e and 1692e(10), we also hold that Prober’s notice did not violate those provisions. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.